Book review
Against Calvinism
Full description of book:
Roger Olson, Against Calvinism (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2011). ISBN 978-0-310-32467-6.
Review:
The book by Dr. Roger Olson is a companion volume to Michael Horton's book For Calvinism, and the two of them are published in order to forward the conversation between Calvinism and Arminianism.
As a book written to disprove Calvinism, Olson begins chapter one with the rationale for his book, stating that "someone needs ... to stand up and in love firmly say 'No!' to egregious statements about God's sovereignty often made by Calvinists" (p. 23). Chapter two deals with what Calvinism and Reformed theology refers to, chapter 3 with the "mere Calvinism" adopted by many of the New Calvinists in TULIP, which he then proceeds to critique in subsequent chapters — first Calvinism's teaching of God's sovereignty, then the U, the L and the I which he find objectionable in the TULIP acrostic. Olson then concludes with what he claims are Calvinism's conundrums that show the marked inconsistencies in the system.
As a book and attack on Calvinism, this reviewer finds it manifestly unconvincing. Credit is given however for Olson's correct portrayal of the general outline of what Calvinism teaches. However, Olson does not seem to go beyond accurately presenting the basic outlines of Calvinism and instead see logical implications where none exist, as we shall see later.
Prolegomena
What is considerably worse however is Olson's attitude towards the whole issue which inform his exegesis of Scripture. Olson in his book claim to operate with the Wesleyan Quadrilateral, where Scripture is the "primary source and norm of theology," tradition is the "normed norm," reason is the critical tool for interpreting Scripture and weeding out absolutely incredible theological claims that contradict each other," and experience is "the inevitable crucible in which theology is done" (p. 24). First of all, his professed method is rationalistic, since reason is NEVER meant to weed out incredible theological claims at the start, but rather to be utilized only AFTER revelation is premised. Reason reasons after truth, thinking God's thoughts after Him. Only after God has spoken can reason come in to systematize truths, not before (cf 1 Cor. 1:25; 2:6-7,14-15).
Olson's rationalistic attitude however goes even further. On page 85, Olson wrote:
One day, at the end of a class session on Calvinism's doctrine of God's sovereignty, a student asked me a question I had put off considering. He asked: "If it was revealed to you in a way you couldn't question or deny that the true God actually is as Calvinism says and rules as Calvinism affirms, would you still worship him?" I knew the only possible answer without a moment's thought, even though I knew it would shock many people. I said no, that I would not because I could not. Such a God would be a moral monster.
Here, we see Olson's fundamental attitude towards Scripture and biblical truths. Olson is a thoroughgoing rationalist. A true Christian who truly loves God will not answer in this manner. If a Christians loves God, they will accept God regardless of who He actually is. No doubt of course God's being is co-terminus with His attributes[1], and therefore if a being does not possess certain divine attributes, that being cannot be God. But the question as phrased deals with our personal conception of God, not whether a being that calls Himself God does not possess certain divine attributes pertaining to God. If the true God is not who we conceive Him to be, the Christian response is to jettison our errant beliefs and worship God, not reject Him because He does not fit into our preconceived mold of what God must be like.
Olson betrays his basic rationalism with the shocking admission above. In Olson's rationalistic scheme, the attributes of "love" and "moral goodness" as understood by him and other synergists ARE the primary lens through which Scripture and God is to be interpreted. Instead of God defining for us who He is and what He is like, Olson insists that God must be what Olson thinks is the "ideal being" or He is not God at all — truly a theology from below.
Such an unbiblical view of God taints Olson's hermeneutics. As Olson remarked during the conversation held at Biola which this reviewer attended, the texts of Scripture that seem to teach Calvinism cannot mean what it means because they contradict [Olson's view of] who God is. In other words, the attribute of "love" and "moral goodness" as understood by Olson is THE hermeneutical lens through which the Bible is to be read. Verses must be interpreted in light of this a priori, or re-interpreted if their meaning is fundamentally at odds with the attributes of "love" and "moral goodness."
Looking at the exegesis of verses of Scripture therefore is almost a waste of time, for Olson deals very surfacely with the actual texts of Scripture in their context, some of which we will look at later. The actual meaning of these texts are after all not important for him, for his a priori commitment has already pre-determined what the verses cannot say. It is extremely disappointing for those who desire biblical exegesis and interaction at the text level, for Olson does not do anything more than a surface treatment of these texts in question.
Detailed analysis
We will now move on to a more detailed analysis through Olson's book.
Chapter 2 — Whose Calvinism? Your guess is as good as mine
Olson attempts to delineate the terms "Calvinism" and "Reformed." Unfortunately, Olson starts by questioning the embrace of TULIP as being part of Calvinism as he looks at the older established historic Calvinist and Reformed denominations and ecumenical bodies. Specifically, Olson looks at the WCRC (World Communion of Reformed Churches) (p. 29). Olson's argument in this chapter basically boils down to this: some of these denominations, some theologians who call themselves Calvinist or Reformed, these world bodies who call themselves Reformed — all of them basically deny TULIP so therefore TULIP is extreme or "radical Reformed theology" (p. 28).
First of all, such is horrendous historical revisionism. "Calvinist" and "Reformed" historically mean something. If a theologian, church, denomination or ecumenical body denies any part of what has been historically held to be Calvinism or Reformed theology, that they are the ones departing from the tradition and therefore should not co-opt the term by redefining it. Just like the person who denies Christ cannot continue to call himself a Christian, so those who deny Calvinism cannot continue to call themselves Calvinists. This is basic use of nomenclature. As Dr. R Scott Clark says in another form, it is inherently narcissistic to think that whatever someone who calls themselves Reformed teaches must be Reformed also[2]. Olson's methodology here therefore fails. What Calvinism is or what Reformed theology is cannot be determined by what those who call themselves "Reformed" and "Calvinist" believe and teach, but rather what is historically and objectively taught by the Reformed churches in their confessions.
It must be noted here that for the WCRC one of the member churches in America is the PCUSA[3]. It is astonishing that Olson think that a liberal denomination that denies the authority of Scripture and the Gospel of justification by faith alone can even be considered as a legitimate representative of the Christian faith, nevermind Calvinism and Reformed theology. Conversely, one struggles to find confessional Reformed denominations such as the OPC, URCNA, RPCNA or even Kuyper's denomination in the list. Olson thus makes a categorical error even in trying to identify Calvinism and Reformed theology by reference to these mainline churches and theologians, in an effort to paint historic Calvinism and Reformed theology as being "radical." A truly more representative group who embrace Calvinism and Reformed theology is NAPARC (North American Presbyterian and Reformed Council), although of course it is our creeds and confessions (Belgic Confession, Heidelberg Catechism, Canons of Dordt, Westminster Standards) that define what Calvinism and Reformed theology is.
Chapter 3 — Mere Calvinism
Olson decides to parade the varieties within the confessional Calvinist tradition here. The Amyraldians are put forward as an alternative, disregarding the fact that Amyraldism was censored by the Formula Consensus Helvetica. The supralapsarianism/ infralapsarianism issue was raised, but since both sides affirm TULIP, there is no issue here. The different slant on the minutiae of TULIP among various theologians is highlighted, but what this has to do with the topic at hand is puzzling. The issue of the well-meant offer is brought up on pages 60-61, an issue which we will look at later in more detail.
As a foretaste of the next section, Olson makes a statement about God's sovereignty that illumines for us the basis behind the Arminians' profession of belief in the sovereignty of God. Olson claims that alternate theologies of God's sovereignty and salvation believe that God sovereignly self-limits his own sovereignty (p. 66). Let us think over that statement for a moment. Is that even a valid statement to make? Analogously, can we say that God who is all-powerful powerfully cripples Himself so as to self-limits His own power? Or to put it in a simpler form, can God create a stone so heavy that He cannot carry? Such paradoxes are nonsensical, for they are not real paradoxes but contradictions!.God can never sovereignly self-limits His own sovereignty, in the same way that God cannot create a stone so heavy that He cannot carry. It is not a limit on God's part, for God cannot do what is illogical. God cannot make square circles, for the simple fact is that something that anything with edges cannot even resemble a circle (we are speaking of 2-D Euclidian geometry here). God cannot make Himself to not exist, neither could God make a non-burning fire nor a air-filled vacuum. All of these are irrational and invalid concepts, and God cannot do such nonsense.
Olson's idea of God's sovereignty therefore is manifestly irrational. The phrase God "sovereignly self-limits his own sovereignty," can either be taken in two different senses— to mean that He refuses to exercise sovereignty in choosing to do or not do something, or taken in the literal sense that He cannot therefore exercise sovereignty at all on such matters. If the latter where God is unable to exercise sovereignty, then He is not sovereign at all. If the former where God refuses to exercise sovereignty, then God is not self-limiting His sovereignty but exercising it in basically leaving the events and consequences to chance. God has abdicated His kingship so to speak. Is such a God worthy of worship, that in the nature of allowing us free will, He decides to look on while His creatures rebel against Him? If as Olson says, God is doing all He can to save us, then either He is not able and thus not sovereign, or He is unwilling and thus that statement is a lie and God is not doing all He can to save us. Whichever of the options chosen, the implications is most decidedly not friendly to the Arminian cause. Either God is not sovereign after all, or God is not doing all He can to save people. And to the Arminian who thinks that the latter is a good thing because God needs to respect our free will in order for Him to be good, one wonders if the Arminian really believes what he claims to believe. Analogously, what will one think of a person who knows that a certain fruit is poisonous yet allow person Y to eat it since person Y insists on eating it and he needed to respect his free will? Should not love compel him to use all possible means to prevent person Y from eating the fruit, up to and including physically overpowering and restraining person Y? Yet the synergists somehow think that God not doing all He can to save people is actually a good thing. To parrot their pet phase: "What love is this?"
Chapter 4 — God's Sovereignty and Divine Determinism
Olson calls some inconsistent Calvinists on the carpet for their denial that Calvinism implies Determinism. Fine, but then it is one thing to say that it implies some form of determinism; it is another thing to think that all forms of determinism is bad.
On page 75, Olson raises the objection that whatever is necessary cannot be gracious, and therefore Calvinism with its determinism makes the creation necessary thus undermining grace. This is however an argument that fails to take into account the difference between God's will ad intra and ad extra. What is necessary for God ad intra is what is necessary indeed. However, if God freely wills to do something like for example create the world, then God's willing it makes that action subsequently necessary, although it is God who freely wills it. Olson fails to distinguish between an absolute necessity and a subsequent necessity here.
In a similar note, Olson fails to distinguish God's glory ad intra and ad extra in his critique of the rationale of God doing everything for His glory, and thus accuses Calvinists of saying that God needs the world in order to manifest His glory (p. 93), thus undermining the aseity of God. According to Calvinism, God's glory is perfect, but His glory is perfection in Himself and is not revealed to the world. Therefore, God does not need the world to be inherently glorious, but the manifestation of His glory (ad extra) requires external beings to be present to behold the revelation of God's glory.
One thread which runs throughout Olson's argument is that moral responsibility implies human ability. This premise may sound right to many people, and is in fact true when dealing with human relations, but why should we accept that when it deals with our relation to God? What is the predication for responsibility, but that one is held accountable for his actions? Accountability not ability is the precondition for responsibility. Within humans, ability imply accountability because those who do not have the ability to for example not stop stealing are sick, and sickness is not one that the person is responsible for. However, God deals with humans under our federal head Adam. We fell in Adam and we are furthermore held responsible for all the subsequent sins we commit in our lives. Sinners are not sick but rebels actively choosing to sin. That we cannot not sin is irrelevant after all since Man in his natural state does not even desire to not sin.
Olson furthermore does not think through this objection of his, which is actually a double edged sword against Arminianism as well. If moral responsibility implies human ability, then Man cannot be held responsible for any sin which he commits since he is sinful from birth. Since Arminianism affirms original sin, then God cannot send Man to hell for sinning because Man cannot do otherwise. This goes to the issue of faith in Jesus Christ as well, as unbelief in a sin. How can Olson hold an unbeliever responsible for not believing in the Gospel, since his sinful nature means he is unable to do so? Olson could of course use the Arminian notion of prevenient grace, an idea without biblical proof at all, but given the fact that prevenient grace is meant to only make Man able to choose to believe the Gospel, where does this leave those unreached people who have never heard the Gospel message at all? If one believes, contrary to Scripture, that they are saved by obeying what light of nature they have, then perhaps it would be better NOT to preach the Gospel to them, since those who have obeyed what light of General Revelation they have might reject the Gospel when they hear it.
The main thrust of Olson's objection in this chapter is that having God ordain everyone means that God is a "moral monster." God in his view would be no different from the devil. The problem for everyone including Olson is that there is evidently evil in the world. If God does not ordain everything including evil, then evil serves no visible function; evil is pointless and purposeless. Olson's postulation of a consequent will to account for how God uses evil for His purposes, in a reactionary manner to evil, calls into question the doctrine of God's immutability and aseity. Does God change when faced with evil? If however, God's consequent will is moved into the realm of eternity through God's foreknowledge of evil, then another question arise: Is God's will determined by something that is temporal? Can the eternal be determined by what is temporal?
The philosophical problem related to the theory of simple foreknowledge comes into play here. As the open theists have realized, exhaustive foreknowledge of the future imply that creatures do not truly have libertarian free will. In light of this, Olson's Arminianism runs into the same problem that Calvinists have. According to Arminianism, God cannot not allow evil to happen. For if God foreknows that evil will happen, then why didn't He prevent it from happening, unless He cannot do so? On the issue of salvation, if God foreknows that a person Sam will not accept the Gospel, then why did God not create him instead of creating him to go to hell? For it is better not to be born than to burn in hell forever. Furthermore, can Sam chose to believe in the Gospel if God foresaw that Sam would not chose to believe? Instead of preaching to the elect (Olson's caricature of what Calvinism will lead to), evidently Olson to be true to his Arminianism with its theory of simple foreknowledge has to preach to those foreknown to believe. Perhaps some contemplative prayer will show Olson who are those whom God foreknows will believe and he can then preach to these only.
Therefore, unless one wants to drift into Open Theism, one needs to embrace a form of determinism. Far better to say with Scripture that God decrees evil in order to bring about a greater good (which as a rejoinder to Olson means that we do not necessarily know what is the greater good that God intends), than to think of evil as having no purpose and God reacting and thinking of how to make it all good in spite of evil. Furthermore, if evil is not decreed by God, then there is another force at work in the universe independent of God, be it chance or something else. Any admission of that leads to Manicheanism with its dualism between God and the forces of evil.
Concluding this section, we see that Olson's objections are double edged. What he accuses Calvinism of can be used likewise against Arminianism. The only way to escape the charge of determinism is to either embrace Open Theism and Process Theology (both beyond the pale of orthodoxy), but I doubt that Olson wants to go there, although his friendship with the late Open Theist Clark Pinnock may indicate to us more than meets the eye.
Chapter 5 — Election and Double Predestination
Olson is correct that a belief in unconditional election implies double predestination. From there, Olson argues that since God's choice of election is unconditional, it must be arbitrary (p. 115). Such a conclusion however is in error, especially because it contradicts the express teaching of Scripture on this topic. Eph. 1:5 teaches that the basis for election is based upon the purpose of God's will, or God's good pleasure, the counsel of His will (cf Eph. 1:11). God is not arbitrary in his choice, for God is not subject to chance. What it is in His will that make Him choose one person over the other God does not reveal and it is therefore none of our business. What Scripture says is that God's choice is deliberate and made by Him alone based upon His good pleasure alone. It makes no difference if Olson cannot understand that God's will is not arbitrary, for chance is not the ruler of our destinies. On the contrary, chance plays a huge role in the Arminian system since God is not sovereign (as understood in the proper definition of what sovereignty means) and Man with his libertarian free has equal probability to choose one way or the other if no compulsion is present either way.
One person that Olson loves to quote is the theologian James Daane, who evidently calls himself Reformed yet he denies TULIP. As a hostile witness, he is indeed effective just as a spy is effective in warfare to work towards the defeat of the enemy from within. But as we have shown, the Reformed confessions define what Reformed is, and Daane as such is not Reformed or a Calvinist. Pages 124-125 show Daane promoting the idea of corporate election, which however contradicts the express teaching of Scripture. Eph. 1:4-11 is unmistakably speaking of individuals, as groups cannot be adopted or sealed with the Holy Spirit. Rom. 9 in context was written as Paul's defence of why the Jews as a whole have rejected Christ, with the argument being that not all who are of Israel are truly Israel (Rom. 9:6). Taking election corporately makes no sense, for how would saying that God elects a group and reprobates a group answer the charge that God's promises to Israel have failed? We note here that Paul was differentiating between those who are externally of Israel and internally of Israel in Rom. 9:6, and differentiating within a group must pertain to individuals! Daane and Olson are thus in error in thinking that Romans 9 actually teach corporate election.
Chapter 6 — Particular Redemption
Olson's first major argument is astonishing, saying that the atonement does not save anyone since one has to fulfil certain conditions like faith in order to be saved (p. 138). Olson here does not seem to understand the difference between God ordaining the ends, and God ordaining the means to be certain to achieve the ordained ends. For in Calvinism, salvation is organic and flows from one stage to the other as Man regenerated by the Spirit freely believes in Christ by the gift of faith given to him. That Olson does not understand secondary causation and the certainty of ordained means for the reaching of ordained ends is very plain here, but just because Olson does not understand them does not make them illogical. Given Olson's premise of libertarian free will, it is understandable that he will find it difficult to understand the wisdom of God in double agency. So once again, Olson's rationalism rears its ugly head.
The next error concerns the difference between the sufficiency and efficiency of the atonement. Christ's death is sufficient to save everyone, yet it is only made efficient for the elect. Olson here counter-accuses Calvinists of wasting some of Christ's blood since Christ's blood was more than enough to save yet was not applied to save all (p. 141). The issue is that Olson misunderstands the whole expression of "sufficient for all, efficient for some" as a quantitative expression, as if Christ's blood was divided into as many buckets as there are people who have lived on this world. In such a quantitative scheme, only some buckets of Christ's blood were utilized while the rest were not and thus wasted. However, this expression was never meant to be interpreted in a quantitative sense but qualitatively. The worth of Christ's atonement was sufficient to save all, but it was given only for the purchase of the salvation of the elect. No blood is wasted here since it is a qualitative not a quantitative scheme.
A major focus of Olson's attack on Calvinism concerns the doctrine of the Well-meant offer which is undermined by Calvinism, and therefore Calvinists cannot logically tell people that "Jesus died for you" (p. 142). The problem for Olson is neither does the Scripture ever show any evangelistic presentation where the apostles and evangelists told anyone that Christ died for them. As a consistent Calvinist, I contend that the Well-Meant Offer is unbiblical in nature since it imputes irrationality and unfulfilled emotions to God. Rather, I hold to the Universal free offer of the Gospel, whereby we as Christians in evangelism proclaim the Gospel message as that "Christ died for sinners" and sinners who obey the command to repent and believe in Jesus Christ are saved. Olson can legitimately criticize the inconsistent Neo-Amyraldians for their embrace of the Well-Meant Offer, but it is untrue that denial of the Well-Meant Offer equates to denial of God's offer of salvation in any other sense. Olson continues in this thread with the question of why God would offer salvation to those who he intends to exclude (p. 151). That is a legitimate question to ask the inconsistent Calvinists, but certainly it is not something which troubles us, for God does not offer the reprobate qua reprobate salvation. In fact, you will never see God offering salvation to the reprobates qua reprobates. For example, we do not see God offering salvation to Esau or Ishmael in the Bible. God did not offer Agag the king of the Amalekites salvation but judgment! God's offer of salvation is stated as being given to the world. Surely an Arminian with his view of corporate election should understand when God deals with Man as a collective group here! God offers sinners, undifferentiated sinners, salvation. There is no tension between God's dealings with Man in the collective as opposed to as individuals, for they are two separate categories altogether. Here, I truly find it ironic that where Calvinism treats of election as individual, Olson and Arminians treat election as corporate, while conversely where Calvinism treats of the Gospel offer as corporate, Olson and the Arminians want to make it individual.
Olson's next argument deals with Owen's argument against universal atonement on the issue of the payment for sin. Since God cannot punish the same sins twice, Christ's atonement means that the sinner cannot still be punished for his own sins (p. 142). Olson dismisses this argument by saying that "the claim that objective atonement necessarily includes or entails subjective, personal salvation is faulty" (p. 149). First of all, Olson's sentence means that the atonement in the Arminian system only makes Man savable, not saved, contradicting the promise of God in Mt. 1:21. It is thus a surprising admission on Olson's part that in the Arminian system, Christ's atonement itself does not save sinners but merely makes them savable. This undermines Olson's professed belief in substitutionary atonement, since if Jesus did not actually save anyone in the atonement, then He did not die as anyone's substitute, but at most a potential substitute contingent upon the person exercising faith in Christ. While certainly Olson denies vehemently that boasting is allowed in the Arminian system (p. 158), the issue here is not whether Arminians will actually boast but whether they have grounds to boast, an issue which we shall look at in the analysis of the next chapter.
Olson further attempts to blunt John Owen's double payment dilemma by using a flawed analogy, of which they are many within the book. The analogy Olson used is that a person offering to pay a $1000 fine on behalf of his friend, and then his friend later insists on paying the fine himself. The problem with Olson's analogy is that it does not even work. If the fine was already paid to and accepted by the court, the court cannot take the friend's payment as a matter of judicial procedure. The fine has been paid, and that's legally settled. The friend can pay the fine himself if the person has not yet paid the fine, but once the fine is paid, it is paid. If the friend insist on paying the fine, he can go to find his friend the person who paid on his behalf and insists that he accepts the $1000. So likewise, the atonement has already paid for the punishment due to our sins, and that as a settled reality is totally objective not subjective. Just like the court does not care whether you feel the fine is paid as long as it is paid, so too the subjective element is totally irrelevant to the actual application of the atonement to men. The subjective element comes in only in light of the prior objective payment of the atonement, not as a completion of the objective element as if our subjective state actualize the potentiality of the atonement itself!
Chapter 7 — Irresistible Grace/ Monergism
The main objection, which we have previewed in our analysis of the last chapter, is Olson's denial that Arminians desire to boast. As we have said, that is not part of any Calvinist argument against Arminianism. It is the rare Arminian who thinks that he can boasts because he chose Christ. The issue before us is whether Arminians have any ground for boasting at all, not actually whether they do so. Olson utilizes one of his analogies to try to prove his case — that of the kind professor who gives a poor student a check to tide him over the month's expenses. Olson rightly shows that it is ridiculous for the student to claim some credit for having accepted the check, but this is not the same as not taking any credit at all. Olson's analogy breaks down because the type of credit the student Olson made him claim for himself is so disproportionate to the kindness of the professor who gave him the check. Knowing that there are people just like him who reject the check, the type of credit the poor student could claim is that he is smart enough to accept the check compared to the others like him who reject it, and do so not in a overbearing manner but a modest manner befitting his little contribution to the acceptance of the check. The problem with Olson's analogy thus is not that the poor student has no grounds for boasting, but he does so in a disproportionate manner. So likewise, what Olson's analogy only proves is that contributing 0.1% towards one's salvation means that one can only boast in the tiny 0.1% of one's efforts and not 10% of the effort towards one's salvation since one only contributes that 0.1%.
If the ultimate ground of one's salvation is because I make use of my free will better than others just like me, then this decision is grounds for a little boasting, regardless of whether such boasting actually occurs. Olson thus fails to refute this argument but use another failed analogy here.
Finally, Olson attempts to tug at the heartstrings by asking us to imagine if someone were to behave like God in real life (p. 166). The problem with this thought experiment is that Man is not God and as such the thought experiment will not work. Even Arminians believe that God gives and takes life, and this cannot be translated into any sort of thought experiment for Man. The only thing the thought experiment can prove is that Man are monsters if they usurp God's authority, but nothing about God per se. God is sui generis, one of a kind, and Man cannot try to be God and usurp His prerogatives.
Miscellaneous
Olson in his book trumpets the fact that God is love. Indeed, God is love, but what has that to do with us per se unless Scripture informs us so? For if we just take the fact that God is love, then God who is loving AND holy hates that which is unholy and therefore must hate us sinners. Olson here makes a categorical error in not differentiating between God's intra-trinitarian characteristic of being love, and God's love towards us. The former is necessary, the latter is not. Just repeating the fact that God is love does not help us one bit, for we as sinners are justly the objects of His wrath. It is only through the shadow of the Cross that we can be the subjects of God's love manifested towards us, a love that is freely given us in Christ. Apart from Christ, the love of God is only present as a generic kindness to creation which is not what we Christians normally call love. Olson's primary objection therefore fells flat. God's love must only be sought in the person of Jesus Christ as God's righteousness to us, not in some Platonic ideal of "love."
With this, let us finish off our review with a look at some of Olson's distortion of Bible verses. It must be stated that the best treatment of these contested verses can be seen in James White's book The Potter's Freedom[4], which Olson unfortunately did not interact with.
Distortion of Bible verses
The "All" passages
Olson made a big fuss over the places where the word "all" is found, and continually emphasize that "all" means "all. In his own words, "there is no way to get around the fact that 'all people' means every single person without exception" (p. 190). Olson however provides no exegetical argument for his position. Given the way the word "all" for example in Mt. 3:5 is used, one wonders if Olson think that Mt. 3:5 actually teaches that every single person without exception in Judea came to John the Baptist for baptism, and the Pharisees since they did not go to John were probably non-entities, non humans!
The fact is that the extent and usage of the word "all" is defined and circumscribed by the context of the text. Just mentioned the word "all," "all people" etc does not prove anything with regards to whether the "all" is extensive or intensive in nature; "all without distinction" or "all without exception."
Lk. 19:40-41
Olson misquotes this verse. As Dr. James White has pointed out in his book on the parallel passage in Mt. 23, Jesus desires to gather the children, but the Pharisees is the subject who "would not" allow the children to come to Christ. The one who would not come are NOT the ones whom Jesus desires to gather.
John 3:14
On page 52, Olson claims that Jn. 3:14 teaches that belief in Jesus will accomplish the necessity of being born again, therefore proving that "there is really no way to reconcile this passage with belief that regeneration precedes faith." Olson gives no exegesis as to why such should be the correct interpretation of the texts. The fact of the matter is that verse 14 does NOT teach that belief in Jesus will accomplish the act of being born again or regeneration. It merely says that the one who believes has eternal life, but eternal life is NOT regeneration. It is simply astonishing that Olson can read his idea of regeneration into the text in such an obvious distortion of it.
John 3:16
Olson states that the word "world" here means the "whole human race" (p. 134), and cites "AT Robertson as quoted by Jerry Vines" — a secondary source. This is sloppy interpretation since not only is the word and verse not exegeted from the original text, but a secondary source is used. One doubts that Olson has even checked the primary source to see if Vines has actually portrayed Robertson correctly. Be that as it may, Robertson is interpreting the text too, so Olson's authority is thrice removed from the context of Scripture. To say that is sloppy exegesis is an understatement, with Olson not even bothering to check the Greek BDAG lexicon.
John 6:44
Olson states that the "drawing" of John. 6:44 cannot be irresistible because the same word is used in Jn. 12:32 where Jesus draws all men to Himself. The problem with Olson's eisegesis, beside ignoring the immediate context of the verse, is that the phrase "all men" can means "all men without distinction" and thus the meaning of "draw" in the sense of irresistible drawing could be preserved without the embrace of Universalism. Olson here read his own idea of "all" into the text, which is very unfortunate.
1 Tim. 2:4
Olson claims that "the Greek of 1 Tim. 2:4 cannot be interpreted any other way than as referring to every person without limit" (p. 68). On pages 112-113, Olson continued discounting the Reformed interpretation by saying it "hardly fits the language of 1 Tim. 2:4." All these hardly counts as exegesis at all.
Conclusion
In conclusion, Olson's Arminianism is the emperor without any clothes. As we have seen, Olson's arguments are fallacious, his starting point and hermeneutics is contrary to the spirit and teaching of Scripture, and his exegeses of the relevant biblical texts are either shallow or absent. While Olson brilliantly portrays the standard Arminian arguments, the content (as like Arminianism) has no real biblical truth and substance to them. The book can therefore be read for study and understanding of one scholarly view of Arminianism, but it is not recommended for true understanding of the biblical text, remembering how Olson has imposed an a priori framework before even dealing with what the biblical texts teaches.
References:
[1] Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics Volume 2: God and Creation (Ed. by John Bolt, Trans. by John Vriend; Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 2004), p. 173
[2] R Scott Clark, Recovering the Reformed Confessions: Our Theology, Piety and Practice (Phillipsberg, NJ: P&R, 2008), p. 18
[3] WCRC churches, http://www.wcrc.ch/node/164. Accessed Nov 7th 2011.
[4] James R. White, The Potter's Freedom (Calvary Press, 2010)